The Problem with Curriculum and Pedagogy

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Study, like prayer, is a way of being—it is an ethics. Alan A. Block (2004, 2)

The academic field of education is so very reluctant to abandon social engineering. If only we can find the right technique, the right modification of classroom organization (small groups, collaborative learning, dialogue), if only we teach according to “best practices,” if only we have students self-reflect or if only we develop “standards” or conduct “scientific” research, then students will learn what we teach them. If only we test regularly, “no child [will be] left behind.”

Social engineering—our predecessor Edward L. Thorndike (1922, 1) called it, simply, “human engineering”—appears to assume that education is like a complex automobile engine: if only we make the right adjustments—in teaching, in learning, in assessment—it will hum, and transport us to our destination, the promised land of high test scores, or, for many of us on the educational left, a truly democratic society (Gaztambide-Fernandez and Sears, 2004).

America’s historic preoccupations with business and religion have provided cultural support for such a view of mind, a view profoundly anti-intellectual in consequence, as Richard Hofstadter (1962) has famously documented. The “business-minded” are interested in designing “effects” on situations that can be profitable. In this sense, social engineering is the complement of capitalism. The “religiously-minded” mangle the present by disavowing it (“the best is yet to come”) or by employing religious rituals (such as prayer) to manipulate present circumstances. Protestantism and capitalism are famously intertwined (Weber 2002 [1930]), perhaps most savagely in the American South (Pinar 2001, 2004b).

Social engineering has structured much of American intellectual life. It has structured, some allege, that American philosophical movement known as pragmatism, thanks in part to William James’ construal of the significance of thought as its “effects” on situations
(Simpson 2002, 98–99). Pragmatism’s progressive formulation of social engineering has been eclipsed, as we are painfully aware, by political conservatism, intent on side-stepping culture and history by focusing on “learning technologies” such as the computer. If only we place computers in every classroom, if only school children stare at screens (rather than at teachers, evidently) they will “learn,” will become “competitive” in the “new millennium.” Information is not knowledge, of course, and without ethical and intellectual judgement—which cannot be programmed into a machine—the Age of Information is an Age of Ignorance.

In 1938, the first Department of Curriculum and Teaching was established in the United States (at Teachers College, Columbia University). This historic mistake—the conjunction of curriculum with teaching—institutionalized social engineering at the site of the teacher. In so doing, the field set itself up for the eclipse of curriculum development and the politics of scapegoating, vividly obvious in No Child Left Behind, wherein teachers are held responsible for student learning. Despite its very different politics, progressive education also inflated the role of the teacher in the process of education, suggesting that role could be socially transformative. (1)

Adjusting the inflated status of pedagogy in curriculum studies will be difficult but necessary labor. To contribute to that project, I focus here on the concept of “study,” relying on the work of Robert McClintock and Alan Block. The former provides a history and analysis of its place in humanism; the former locates this lost tradition in Judaism. I suggest that one form of contemporary curriculum research, resulting in a “new” synoptic text (Pinar, 2004a), can also contribute to the resuscitation of this lost tradition. Like teaching or instruction or pedagogy, study, too, should be a subsidiary concept in curriculum studies. (2)

The Lost World of Study

The word study connotes zealous striving. Anna Julia Cooper (Lemert & Bhan 1998, 312)

Robert McClintock begins his argument for study against instruction with attention to Montaigne who, McClintock (1971, 161) tells us, en-
gaged himself in an ongoing project of “self-education.” A process, study is also a place (as McClintock makes explicit in his essay’s title); for Montaigne, that place was Montaigne’s study wall to which he appended sayings—(McClintock quotes one from Lucian)—stimulating the process of his self-formation through the creation of a “self-culture,” stimulating self-reflection as he went about his daily life (McClintock, 1971, 161). Sayings appended to the wall, McClintock (1971, 161) theorizes, stimulated his “self-formation.”

As if anticipating the Marxist misunderstanding of autobiography as narcissism (3), McClintock (1971, 161) points out that study is not only a private project. For Montaigne, he notes, education was a neverending “heightening” of “consciousness,” an unceasing cultivation of judgement (1971, 161). McClintock (1971, 162) observes that Montaigne worried that relying on teachers for one’s education could replace one’s self-engaged labor of discovery with passivity (1971, 162). “Authoritative” instruction can discourage thinking, McClintock (1971, 162) notes. The instructional authoritarianism that No Child Left Behind legislates portends the same result.

Montaigne was hardly alone in preferring study to instruction. McClintock names Erasmus as a second example. “[I] shall not refuse any task,” McClintock (1971, 162) quotes him as saying, “if I see that it will be conducive to the promotion of honest study.” He justified his editorial labor—recall that Erasmus edited both pagan and Christian classics—as providing readers with important literature for personal study. His writing—McClintock cites The Handbook of the Christian Knight—aimed to support readers’ self-formation and self-possession (McClintock, 1971). Teaching and learning might disseminate knowledge, McClintock (1971, 162) notes, but study enables “understanding.”

Self-formation specifies no “standards” or “best practices,” however, as the paths of study are numerous (1971, 164–165). Study follows not from compliance with instructions, but from an aspiration to assert “control” over the shifting conjunctions between self and circumstances (1971, 165). While I disclaim the aspiration for “control,” I embrace study’s capacity to contest conformity. (4) The final phrase of McClintock’s sentence—pointing to the conjunctions between self and circumstances—acknowledges the historicity and cultural situatedness of the “self.”

It is through study that we “impose” our character upon our roles in life, McClintock (1971, 165) asserts. For me, this verb is too volun-
tarist and essentialist: after Lacan we must acknowledge that any Rortyian reinvention of ourselves is limited, and occurs, yes, through acts of "will," but, as well, through waiting, withdrawing, dissimulation. Certainly, I share McClintock's sense that there is an ethical even, we might say, ontological call to "be here," in Sartre's sense of "engagé," in Grumet's (1988) call for us to embrace relationality and attachment. But the imagery of "impose" (McClintock, 1971, 165) lacks subtlety and complexity; perhaps it is too masculinist.

McClintock's notion of study is expansive; it is by no means limited to the official curriculum. The student draws upon "nature," "faith," and "reason" as these speak to his "situation," enabling him to convert the contingencies of time, place, and circumstance into "achieved intention" (1971, 165). The echoes of the early Sartre are loud here; if we dwell on the aesthetics rather than the gender of "achieved intention" we can appreciate the creative, singular, and social sense of study. In the "art" of study, McClintock (1971, 165) explains, all of culture can, potentially, become educational. If one studies, that is.

In this ancient, nearly forgotten, tradition, study is the site of education. Not instruction, not learning, but study constitutes the process of education, a view, McClintock (1971, 167) tells us, grounded in "individuality," "autonomy," and "creativity." (The three are, of course, inter-related.) Again sounding like the early Sartre, McClintock (1971, 167) emphasizes the significance of our "particularity," that we become more than we have been influenced to be, that we (here he anticipates Rorty) refashion ourselves by engaging "freely" and "creatively" our circumstances.

Such a statement recalls certain strands of the progressive tradition, although not its confidence that we can teach freedom for creativity, let alone for individuality and autonomy. Rather, from the point of view of study, self-formation follows from our individual appropriation of what is around us; this capacity for selection, for focus, for judgement, McClintock suggests, is the great mystery to be solved (1971, 167). This is, I submit, the mystery that autobiography purports not to solve, but to portray and complicate (Pinar, 1994).

McClintock's has a faith in an "inward" almost "inborn" capacity for judgement that directs us to that to which we "attend" (1971, 168). It is a faith I do not, but would like to, share. But the point to which this faith is in service I endorse, namely that education is only "incidentally" a function of teaching and learning, that it is, necessarily, a "zig-
zag” and “self-directed” process of intellectual experimentation by means of which the individual’s capacity for judgement is cultivated and takes, perhaps, a “transcendent” turn (McClintock, 1971, 168). Questions of transcendence aside (certainly for many in the West there is the “lure” [Huebner 1999] of that), here McClintock risks solidifying the self, overstating its force and autonomy while understating the inextricably interwoven relations among self-formation, society, and the historical moment (Pinar, 2004b).

McClintock (1971, 169) quickly complicates this naïve view of the structure and force of the self by citing Eros, the “expectant” and “fecund force” that “stimulates” one’s “craving urge.” He associates Eros not with Freud but with Plato, but the two merge in his choice of words to describe eroticism and its life-structuring influence, namely an “insatiable, polymorphous teleology” (McClintock, 1971, 169). Joseph Schwab, too, linked Eros with study, with liberal education more specifically: “Not only the means, however, but also the ends of liberal education involve Eros. For the end includes not only knowledge gained but knowledge desired and knowledge sought” (Schwab, 1978, 109; quoted in Block, 2004, 131). Block’s analysis suggests that such desire is expressed educationally through study.

### Study as a Prayerful Act

*Study … is a prayerful act.* Alan A. Block (2004, 2)

Alan Block has Schwab, not Macdonald (1995), in mind when he characterizes “engagement in study [as] engagement in prayer” (2004, 2). Block (2004) argues that Schwab believed that even the point of assessment was to provoke study. While an act of faith (Macdonald, 1995), prayer—and the conception of study to which faith is allied—is not a “cause” in hopes of a future “effect,” a disavowal of this world in hopes of a better deal in a future one. Rather, within the rabbinical tradition, Block (2004, 2) argues, “study, like prayer, is a stance we assume in the world.” As such, “study, like prayer, is a way of being—it is an ethics” (Block, 2004, 2). It does not repudiate the mundane; prayer “sacralizes the mundane. So, too, does study” (Block, 2004, 3).

Like prayer, then, study is a spiritual discipline. It is an intellectual discipline as well, but not one that leads to confidence about cause-
effect relationships in human affairs. “In prayer and in study,” Block (2004, 3) writes, “we acknowledge that our knowledge will never suffice and that what we undertake in the classroom is merely a hint of all that exists outside it.” Echoing Dwayne Huebner (1999: see chapter 1), Block (2004, 3) regards “prayer and study [as] emanating from the silence of awe and wonder.”

Block is working in Jewish not Christian traditions. To appreciate Schwab’s notion of “deliberation,” Block (2004, 11) situates the concept in “the traditional Jewish pedagogical methods of the yeshiva, itself, perhaps, based in ancient Jewish exegetical traditions.” In the yeshivah, “study [is] institutionalized … as a performative act carried out by the students’ participation, [and] the learning space is shaped by the intensity and quality of the ongoing exchange of its students” (Halbertal and Halbertal, 1998, 459). Such complicated conversation is simultaneously intellectual and spiritual. “At the center of Judaism,” Block (2004, 58) argues, “is the love and study of text—of Torah. This study is not theoretical but practical, not reverential but critical: At the center of Judaism is practical study.” Does our field’s emphasis upon teaching disclose its Christian rather than Jewish character? Is the “lost world of study” a victim of Christian culture’s aggressivity? (5)

Because “study is the equivalent of prayer,” Block (2004, 83) continues, “the classroom must be considered a sacred place.” But this is not a place severed from the world: “For the Rabbis, study must be related to the practical—to the continued striving for a holiness that can only be realized in our daily lives in this world” Block (2004, 83). This is no instrumentalist conception of the practical, however, “Study is central,” Block (2004, 84) explains, “but it must be practical as well, and its practice must lead only to ethical living.” In my terms, this is the practice of theory.

Technologies of Attention

*When we study we must actively pursue—to draw toward us—not only what is under study but the context in which and from which that study has been drawn.* Alan A. Block (2004, 81)

In both Jewish and Christian traditions, ethical living requires redemption of the self. For McClintock, such self-redemption is secular.
Its ends and means merge in study. Animated by Eros, intellectual interest would seem to be McClintock’s guide to study: he characterizes intellectual interest as the student’s “essential power,” his capacity for “attention” (1971, 169). “Intellectual interest” has a long history in curriculum theory—Kilpatrick (1918), for one, linked interest with the formulation and execution of educational projects—but now the notion seems to me too vulnerable to consumerist chimera, detached, too often, from Eros, rendering it merely a distraction. I, too, had faith in it as a compass, as my early autobiographical experiments testify (1978). The word is mine; we can pause to consider its problems by focusing on McClintock’s word: “attention.”

What is at stake is the status of “intellectual interest” and McClintock’s version of it (“attention”) is the extent to which they are reliable as guides or, to change metaphors, “rudders” to study. Jonathan Crary argues that pragmatists were swimming against the historical current when they emphasized the agency of “attention.” For William James, attention is, in Crary’s words (1999, 61) “inseparable from the possibility of a cognitive and perceptual immediacy in which the self ceases to be separate from a world of objects, even if a stabilization of those objects can never occur.” For James, attention has ethical significance:

> The practical and theoretical life of the whole species, as well as of individual beings, results from the selection which the habitual direction of their attention involves…. Each of us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what sort of a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit. (1950 [1890], 424; quoted in Crary 1999, 62)

In James’ underscoring of the creative agency implicit in attention, we can see the pragmatic antecedent in McClintock’s embrace of study. James’ emphasis on the autonomy of attention occurs, Crary (1999, 63) points out, when technologies and institutions, including the school, are being designed to command the attention of mass populations. Crary implies that James is consciously contradicting the influential work of William B. Carpenter, work done in the 1870s in which attention is described as an element of subjectivity to be externally shaped and controlled:

> It is the aim of the Teacher to fix the attention of the Pupil upon objects which may have in themselves little or no attraction for it.... The
habit of attention, at first purely automatic, gradually becomes, by
djudicious training, in great degree amenable to the Will of the
Teacher, who encourages it by the suggestion of appropriate motives,
whilst taking care not to overstrain the child’s mind by too long
dwelling upon one object. (Carpenter 1886, 134–135; quoted in
Crary 1999, 63)

Pedagogical regulation paralleled other disciplinary forms of self-
regulation and self-control in the nineteenth century (Bederman, 1995;

Certainly Dewey attributed to the teacher a key role in enabling
children to discover, articulate, and expand their interests and thereby
direct their attention. (Even conservative critics of progressivism—
invested in exaggerating the excesses of child-centeredness [Ravitch,
2000, 172]—acknowledge this point.) Dewey brooked little confidence
in what Kliebard characterizes as the metaphor of growth, wherein
“the curriculum is the greenhouse where students will grow and de-
velop to their fullest potential under the care of a wise and patient gar-
dener” (Kliebard, 2000 [1975], 84). For McClintock (1971, 176, 177),
the teacher’s purpose is “hortatory” rather than didactic, to “incite” the
students’ “passion” for study. McClintock locates the decisive turn
from study to instruction with Comenius (1971, 179), but I leave
McClintock’s historical narrative for your private study. Suffice to say
that its end appears definitive: study has now “disappeared”
(McClintock, 1971, 179).

Instead of study, we have “learning” tied tightly, of course, to as-
essment and instruction. Even “curriculum”—presumably the content
of learning—mutates to a means to the end that is assessment. Once
learning described what a person accomplished as a result of serious
study, but now, as McClintock (1971, 179) observes, learning is a con-
sequence of teaching. The psychology of learning enjoys an inflated
status in educational research not because it enables students to study,
but because it enables instructors to devise effective strategies of teach-
ing (McClintock, 1971, 179). I would add that, because “learning” lim-
its study to what is taught, it performs the dirty work of accountability,
that cover for the closure of academic—intellectual—freedom in con-
temporary classrooms, legislated by the Bush Administration.

Study persists, McClintock acknowledges, but in the traditions of
“curriculum and instruction” and “instruction and learning,” that is, as
“how to” treatises outlining short-cuts to good grades. Like Crary, McClintock (1971, 180) locates these technologies historically; they structure the “disciplinary society,” the “governmentality of the self,” the mass production of docile workers and uncritical consumer-citizens. Curriculum limited to instruction and linked to learning and assessment structure national systems of education (1971, 182). As McClintock (1971, 183) appreciates, accountability schemes ensure student “servility.”

If curriculum were conjoined with study, the question is no longer, McClintock (1971, 187) suggests, the “impossible” one of objectives. If curriculum were disjunctive with instruction, the question is no longer what strategies—or “best practices”—I should employ to ensure students’ study of the curriculum and of the “standards” the curriculum institutionalizes. If curriculum were not conjunctive with pedagogy (even the “critical” kind), “transformation” would not be the teacher’s responsibility (Pinar et al., 1995, 327.) Rather, teachers might ask themselves the more “restrained” question of what opportunities for study are appropriate for particular students (McClintock, 1971, 187). McClintock’s view here seems to invoke the curriculum metaphor of travel (Kliebard 2000 [1975], 85).

McClintock is critical of the child-centered curriculum as insufficiently child-centered. The problem with the child-centered curriculum, he writes, is that its “subterfuge” instruction disrespects the “sobriety” of the student’s interests (McClintock, 1971, 189). Working with children’s interests toward those of the school subjects—Dewey’s basic pedagogical idea—is disingenuous, McClintock (1971, 189) complains; in fact, the work of the teacher would not be instruction, but to engage each student’s capacity for study. Sounding phenomenological for the moment (Jardine, 1992), McClintock (1971, 190) suggests that in a school devoted to study, not instruction, students will focus on their “real” intellectual difficulties.

Perhaps McClintock is working here with both metaphors of growth and travel, as he envisions schools as providing opportunities to study academic subjects that enable their “practical” and “worldly” employment by students animated by curiosity (McClintock, 1971, 190). Certainly that is part of what I mean when I endorse, in What Is Curriculum Theory?, connecting academic knowledge to society and subjectivity. It is reminiscent—although McClintock shows no signs of
Schwab—of Schwab’s notion of the “practical,” at least as Alan Block (2004) situates the concept within rabbinical traditions.

McClintock connects this conception of study with demographic and character-structure shifts in the West, a reading of which leads him, near the end of the essay, to become slightly sanguine about the future of study. Proliferating and unregulated encounters are important to his analysis; we can surmise that he would be excited by the educational potential of the Internet and the appearance of cyberculture (Pinar, 2001, chapters 5 and 6).

That McClintock is writing at the end of the 1960s (before we knew that it was the end) is evident in his suggestion (referencing Marcuse and his own work in progress Eros and Education [6]) that nearly everywhere, it seems, “coercive” authority is being replaced by “erotic” authority, and “manipulation” replaced by “erotic attraction” (McClintock, 1971, 202). While acknowledging that a society permeated with Eros will not necessarily be a good society, he does speculate that such a society will offer “boundless” opportunities (McClintock, 1971, 203). He ends optimistically, suggesting that the prospects for study seem favorable (McClintock, 1971, 204).

Ah, the remembrance of things past! The prospects for study could hardly be worse; perhaps these circumstances explain why this remarkable essay has been largely overlooked. (7) Because the metaphor of production (Kliebard, 2000 [1975], 84) has triumphed, “instruction”—linked to learning and tied to assessment—replaced “study” as the complement of curriculum. That had already occurred by 1938 when the first Department of Curriculum and Teaching was established at Teachers College, Columbia University. The calamity was capped with Tyler’s pithy Principles of Curriculum and Instruction: “Procedures of Curriculum and Instruction” would have been a more honest title. Whatever Tyler’s intentions, the conclusion is horrifyingly plain—No Child Left Behind—wherein teachers are held responsible for student learning as measured by standardized examinations. The scapegoating politics of school deform represent deferred and displaced versions of racism and misogyny, I argue in What Is Curriculum Theory?, but that is another story. Here I want to focus not upon our “victimhood,” but upon our culpability.

It is a culpability for which we were set up by our predecessors, and not only by Franklin Bobbitt, W. W. Charters, and Ralph Tyler. As noted earlier, John Dewey’s pragmatist predecessor—William
James—was, David Simpson (2002, 98) argues, “consequence oriented,” concerned with the “practical cash value” of experience. The significance of experience—of thought, action, and event—was reduced to its effect on a particular situation. Simpson (2002, 98–99) insists that James’ “faith in instrumentalism” provided a “green light” for applied social science with its emphasis upon measuring outcomes quantitatively. While not especially interested in statistics, the social progressives positioned schools as a means to an end: social reconstruction. If schools could be structured democratically, American society could be reconstructed toward economic and social equality.

Even those who reject progressivism—Kieran Egan is, perhaps, the most startling example, given his earlier reliance on it (see 1990)—reinstall some version of social engineering. “The trouble is,” Egan (2002, 147) writes (sounding for the moment like Diane Ravitch [2000]), “that schools can be quite good institutions when they concentrate on intellectual education, but they are less good at developing the whole person or producing good citizens or ensuring parenting skills.” It has been clear for at least a century that the schools are not so “good” at “intellectual education.” Is not that one reason why progressivism—certainly the child-centered wing of it—became (remains) compelling for so many: that “intellectual education” does not speak to many children, and, in failing to engage children’s interests, alienates them, leaving many a child “behind”?

Perhaps persuaded by our own educational experience, egged on by politicians and parents and, perhaps, by our own megalomania, we teachers (and teacher educators) imagined we could—if only we taught this way, or organized the curriculum that way, or assessed authentically—produce literate and docile workers, or self-reflective and politically engaged citizens, well, name your outcome. We have known for a long time (Bauman, 1978) that, in fact, if human conduct could be regularized and rendered predictable, then the costly and ongoing “scientific” research mounted in the social sciences would have by now succeeded. Of course, as Kieran Egan (2002, 135) points out, authoritarianism works (at least for a while, sometimes a long while, as the Soviet example suggests):

Unless the school has enormous power and authority over children, which in a democracy we are unwilling to allow, the dominant values and behavioral norms will be those the children bring to the school.
and against which any competing values and norms of the teachers’ will be largely helpless.

This is the political point of accountability, of course, to force teachers to force children—especially those “left behind” by forty-years of right-wing assault on them—to accept “new” norms: docility, dependence, and an unquestioning trust of authorities.

Conclusion

*Education is a private engagement in a public world for the redemption of both.*

Alan A. Block (2001, 37)

Instrumental rationality is to blame, I can hear you say, not pedagogy. You are right, of course, instrumental rationality is to blame. There has been much criticism of it in the curriculum studies literature for a long time (Macdonald, 1995). Even the concept of study can fall victim to it, as numerous study guides document. Moreover, teaching can be theorized and practiced in intriguing, even magical, ways, as the pedagogy of Ted Aoki, for one, documents. (8) While teaching can be theorized non-instrumentally (as Aoki’s *œuvre* demonstrates), does not the very concept tempt us to think we can, at the minimum, influence, or more optimistically (or is it arrogantly?), produce, certain effects or consequences?

While numerous so-called “study guides” do not exactly promise “effects,” e.g. good grades, they do employ instrumental rationality, evident, for instance, in the title of the textbook used in Louisiana State University’s College Study course: *Keys to Success in College, Career, and Life* (Carter, Bishop, and Kravits, 2003). Relying on Gardner’s “multiple intelligences” concept, the authors include chapters on “Reading and Studying: Focusing on Content,” “Listening, Memory, and Note Taking: Taking In, Retaining, and Recording Information,” and “Test Taking: Showing What You Know.” But the success to which this “how-to” manual holds the keys is not only academic; there are chapters as well on “Self-Awareness,” “Relating to Others,” and “Wellness and Stress Management.” Foucault would have a field day.

The concept of study is hardly immune to instrumental rationality, self-governmentality, and bureaucratization. But what the disciplinary
attention to instruction or teaching or pedagogy (either the critical or conventional kind) accomplishes is to set intellectual and political traps for the teacher. Power and responsibility accompany the command of attention. It becomes the teacher upon whom the student depends in order to learn: that is the intellectual trap. And it is the teacher who becomes responsible for student learning: that is the political trap.

What the conjunctive relationship between curriculum and teaching, between curriculum and instruction, between curriculum and pedagogy invites, then, is an inflation of the claims and liabilities of the teacher (whether these are after Egan and Ravitch, “intellectual” or “academic” education or, after the progressives, psycho-social reconstruction or workplace utility) that deludes both parents and politicians (not to mention students and teachers) that the locus of responsibility—the very site of education—is the teacher, not the student. The truth is, of course, quite different: teachers provide educational opportunities; students are responsible for taking advantage of them. (9)

Study is the site of education, McClintock (1971, 170) reminds us. While one’s truths—academic knowledge grounded in lived, that is, subjective and social experience—cannot be taught, McClintock (1971, 169) underscores they can be acquired through the struggle of study, for which every individual has the capacity, but not necessarily the will (or the circumstances, I might add). That is the truth that parents, and those politicians who exploit their anxieties over their children’s future, cannot bear to face or, at least, acknowledge. It is the truth we must face and acknowledge. The first step in doing so is forcing the teaching genie back into the bottle. If we have a future, it will come to us through study.

Notes

(1) For a different analysis of the present situation, see Petrina (2004).
(2) My thanks to Kevin Franck for emphasizing this point.
(3) For an especially primitive example, see Carlson (2002, 56).
(4) Despite Freud’s accomplishment, many in the West fantasize they can control themselves and their circumstances. As Dewey implied, democratization of society requires democratization of the self. In both, “control” is a casualty.
(5) For a compelling account of the aggressivity—specifically, the anti-
Semitic aggressivity—of Christian culture, including its secular expressions, see Morris (2001).

(6) Here again McClintock is reminiscent of Schwab. See Schwab’s “Eros and Education” (1978). I can find no evidence McClintock completed the book.

(7) It is the opening piece in a landmark issue of Teachers College Record, with important essays by Maxine Greene, Lawrence Cremin, Philip Phenix, and Douglas Sloan, among others.

(8) In his pedagogical performances, recorded in his numerous conference presentations, Aoki teaches shrewdly but humbly. In his essays, I could find no evidence that he imagined he could produce “effects” as a consequence of his pedagogical moves. As an explicit topic, Aoki characterizes teaching as “in-dwelling” between curriculum-as-plan and curriculum-as-experience. It is a “mode of being.” He is consistently critical of teaching as “doing” and as producing “outcomes” (see Pinar and Irwin, 2005).

(9) True, public-school-age students are not “responsible”—as age-of-consent laws make explicit—in the senses that adults are. And, obviously, teachers can enable students’, especially young children’s, study. But, despite conservative nonsense, parents, not to mention psycho-social, economic, and political conditions, structure (even if they do not fully determine) the child’s capacity to study. There is, centrally, the problem of the curriculum (see Pinar, 2004b). Our liability is, in fact, limited.

References


